between are they that make the longest delays, and be the greatest enemies of expedition and despatch: like as in the counsels of kings and princes, they that speak in favour of one party and for to win grace, do not upon any reason of two sentences incline to the one, but they accommodate themselves to their affection, even against the regard of utility and profit.
And this is the cause that in those states which be called aristocraties, that is to say, governed by a senate or counsel of the greatest men, the magistrates who sit in judgment will not suffer orators and advocates at the Bar to move affections in all their pleas: for in truth, let not the discourse of reason be impeached and hindered by some passion, it will of itself tend directly to that which is good and just. But in case there do arise a passion between, to cross the same, then you shall see pleasure and displeasure to raise a combat and dissension, to encounter that which by consultation would have been judged and determined. For otherwise, how cometh it to pass that in philosophical discourses and disputations a man shall never see it otherwise, but that without any dolour and grief, some are turned and drawn oftentimes by others into their opinions, and subscribe thereto willingly? Nay, even Aristotle himself, Democritus also and Chrysippus, have been known to retract and recant some points which beforetime they held, and that without any trouble of mind, without grief and remorse, but rather with pleasure and contentment of heart: because in that speculative or contemplative part of the soul, which is given to knowledge and learning only, there reign no passions to make resistance, insomuch as the brutish part being quiet and at repose, loveth not curiously to intermeddle in these and suchlike matters: By which means it happeneth that the reason hath no sooner a sight of truth but willingly it inclineth thereto, and doth reject untruth and falsity: for that there lieth in it and in no other part else, that power and faculty to believe and give assent one way, as also to be persuaded for to alter opinion and go another way. Whereas, contrariwise, the counsels and deliberations of worldly affairs, judgments also, and arbitraments, being for the most part full of passions, make the way somewhat difficult for reason to pass, and put her to much trouble. For in these cases the sensual and unreasonable part of the soul is ready to stay and stop her course; yea, and to fright her from going forward, meeting her either with the object of pleasure, or else casting in her way stumbling-blocks of fear, of pain, of lusts and desires.
