Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/394

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.
372
Plutarch's Morals


of these two extremities, he saith, in the first place, that superstition is the most unworthy and unseemly of all the passions of the soul, proving the same by divers reasons, to wit; That the superstitious man is in continual perplexity, he dreadeth his own idol no less than a cruel tyrant, and imagineth a thousand evils even after his death. After this he taketh a view of the atheist, and opposeth him against the superstitious, resolving upon this point; that the superstitious person is more miserable of the twain, as well in adversity as prosperity, and to confirm and satisfy his assertion, he setteth down many arguments and notable examples. Moreover, he sheweth that the superstitious person is an enemy to all Deity or Godhead, he putteth clean out of his heart and treadeth under foot all humanity and righteousness for to please his idols, and in one word, that he is the most wretched caitiff in the world. And for a conclusion he exhorteth us so to fly superstition, that we hold ourselves from falling into atheism, keeping in the middle between; of which point every good man ought to consider and think upon well and in good earnest in these latter times of the world, albeit he who advertiseth us thereof in this place never knew what was true religion.]

The ignorance and want of true knowledge as touching the gods divided even from the beginning into two branches, meeting on the one side with stubborn and obstinate natures, as it were with a churlish piece of ground, hath in them engendered impiety and atheism; and on the other side, lighting upon gentle and tender spirits like a moist and soft soil, hath bred and imprinted therein superstition: now as all error in opinion and judgment, and namely in these matters, is hurtful and dangerous enough; so if it be accompanied with some passion of the mind it is most pernicious. For this we must think, that every one of these passions resembleth a deception that is feverous and inflamed; and like as the dislocations of any joints in a man's body out of their place joined with a wound be worse than others to be cured; even so the distortions and errors of the mind meeting with some passion are more difficult to be reformed. As, for example, set case that one do think that the little motes and indivisible bodies called atomi, together with voidness and emptiness, be the first elements and principles whereof all things are made; certainly this is an erroneous and false opinion of his; howbeit the same breedeth no ulcer, no fever causing disordinate pulse in the arteries, nor yet any pricking and troublesome pain. Doth some one hold that riches is the sovereign good of man? This error and false opinion hath a rust or canker and a worm that eateth into the soul and transporteth the same besides itself, it suffereth it not to take any