Jackson, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 21–1170
HANNA KARCHO POLSELLI, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[May 18, 2023]
Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, concurring.
The Court holds today that there is no “legal interest” limitation on the ability of the Internal Revenue Service to summon records without notice under 26 U. S. C. §7609(c)(2)(D)(i). I agree. I write to emphasize two points I believe are critical to understanding that, despite our rejection of this particular limit, the summoning power of the IRS under that provision is circumscribed nonetheless.
First, while the need for efficient tax administration is certainly important and Congress has given the agency lots of attendant authority, the default rule when the IRS seeks information from third-party recordkeepers under this statute is notice. The IRS can summon “any books, papers, records, or other data” that “may be relevant or material to” determining a taxpayer’s liability or collecting unpaid tax. §§7602(a)(1)–(2). And it can issue such summonses to “any … person the [IRS] may deem proper.” §7602(a)(2) (emphasis added). But, as a general matter, when the IRS issues a summons pursuant to this authority, the agency must provide notice to “any person … identified in the summons” and to whom “any portion of [the requested] records” relate. §7609(a)(1) (imposing notice requirement as the “general” rule).
