Opinion of the Court
marks omitted). In so concluding, the Sixth Circuit aligned itself with both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits. See Davidson v. United States, 149 F. 3d 1190 (CA10 1998) (Table); Barmes v. United States, 199 F. 3d 386 (CA7 1999) (per curiam).
Judge Kethledge dissented. He acknowledged that an ordinary reading of the statute exempted the summonses from notice but thought the statutory context compelled a narrower construction. As an initial matter, Judge Kethledge expressed concern that the panel’s reading of the notice exception risked “a significant intrusion upon the privacy of … account holders.” 23 F. 4th, at 631. He argued that an ordinary reading of the first exception to notice would render the second exception—codified in §7609(c)(2)(D)(ii)—“superfluous.” Ibid. To avoid that, Judge Kethledge would have narrowed the first exception by adopting the legal interest test from the Ninth Circuit. We granted certiorari to resolve the division among the Circuits. 598 U. S. ___ (2022).
III
The question presented is whether the exception to the notice requirement in §7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies only where a delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in accounts or records summoned by the IRS under §7602(a). A straightforward reading of the statutory text supplies a ready answer: The notice exception does not contain such a limitation.
A
The statute sets forth three conditions to exempt the IRS from providing notice in circumstances like these. First, a summons must be “issued in aid of … collection.” §7609(c)(2)(D). Second, it must aid the collection of “an assessment made or judgment rendered.” §7609(c)(2)(D)(i). By “assessment,” the Code “refers to the official recording of a taxpayer’s liability.” Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl,
