and art-galleries, as well as the privileges and advantages of entering them, than have the members of workingmen's clubs; and I doubt not that, if the upper and the lower classes were for a few months to change places, petitions to Parliament of the kind which Lord Thurlow presented would be more numerous and more generally signed. But what does this argue? Surely not that we, who best know the culturing value of these institutions, ought to use the comparative ignorance of those who do not as an argument against extending to them the opportunity of ascertaining that value. On the contrary, in whatever degree indifference can be proved of the working-classes in this matter, it would seem to me a strong argument in favor of instilling into them a more lively perception of the educational advantages of such institutions; and this can only be done by throwing open these institutions on the (virtually) one day in the week when the classes in question are able to visit them. Of course, it may be said that the alleged indifference arises, not from ignorance of the value of such institutions, but from a preponderant sense of Sabbatarianism on the part of the working-classes. But, supposing the alleged apathy to exist, and supposing it to arise from the latter cause alone—which I deem highly improbable—I still think it would constitute no valid argument against the proposed reform. We are all, I take it, agreed upon the recreative as well as what Lord Beaconsfield called the civilizing influence of the institutions in question; so that, upon the suppositions which I have made, the only issue to be considered is as to whether these benefits would be more than counterbalanced by the evils of offending the sense of Sabbatarianism which is assumed so largely to predominate among the working-classes. And this introduces us to the second and only other argument which was adduced by Lord Beaconsfield. He said: "In all questions into which the religious sentiment enters, it is highly desirable that no change should be effected that is not called for by the expression of a very predominant sentiment on the part of the people." If this means that legislation ought not to interfere aggressively with the religious sentiments of the many, it is, no doubt, a proper utterance; but, if it means that the socially harmless and even beneficial recreation of the many is to be prohibited by the particular religious sentiments of the few—and this is what it does mean if the words are taken to mean what they say—then I think the utterance is most improper. The idea which underlies this utterance seems to be that the religious sentiment is of so much value to the state that it ought to be tenderly fostered in all its ramifications, even to the extent of preventing reforms conceded to be beneficial, lest they should prune the twigs of the structure thus tenderly fostered. Now, I do not wish to enter on the question as to how far the religious sentiment is of value to the state; for I think it is quite obvious in the present case that, let us place this value as high as we choose, the contemplated reform can not be other than complete-
Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 15.djvu/803
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SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF RECREATION.
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