the product he calls Positive Philosophy. For what is the one word which describes this theory of transformation, exhibited by the Cosmos as a whole and by every part of it, and proceeding everywhere after the same general manner and everywhere consequent on the same general laws of forces? The one word is Cosmogony. And what is the name applicable to M. Comte's Positive Philosophy? An Organon of the Sciences.
See, then, how the case stands. A system which had for its germinal idea Von Baer's formula of organic development—a system which grew by the addition of other general ideas, to one of which, I believe, Schelling's doctrine of individuation partially opened the way, but the others of which grew up I know not how—a system which slowly became a coherent whole, uniting the several principles by derivation from one ultimate principle—a system the exposition of which followed an order not determined by any theory of classification, but simply by the order of genesis of the phenomena themselves—a system which, at the very outset, presented itself as the rudiment of a cosmogony, and became eventually a fully-elaborated cosmogony; is a system which Mr. Harrison holds to be inspired by Comte's "Organon of the Sciences," the greater part of which is concerned with scientific methods, with the dependence of ideas, with the course of intellectual progress, with the order of discovery, and the like; and which entirely ignores geological evolution, biological evolution, and psychological evolution. This system it is which Mr. Harrison characterizes as "an attempt to play a new tune upon Comte's instrument"!
I ask space only for a few words on the question of authorities. Mr. Harrison, finding the verdict of Mr. John Stuart Mill against him, does his best to discredit it. He says that Mr. Mill was scarcely in a position for judging, since "he had one volume only and part of another before him." Pie is quite mistaken. If I had continued to quote Mr. Mill's letter, I should have quoted a passage saying that he had been re-reading the "Principles of Psychology"(edition of 1855). Besides this, and "Social Statics," and "First Principles," and nearly one volume of the Biology, he had before him two volumes of Essays, the majority of which bear in one way or other on the doctrine of evolution, and sufficiently show the drift of much that was coming. But Mr. Harrison attempts to discredit Mr. Mill's letter by calling it a "testimonial," and saying that he was able to "read between the lines." After having pointed out that I simply asked Mr. Mill to return my letter, and that his letter, accompanying it, was voluntarily written, I think every one will be of opinion that this sneer of Mr. Harrison's is wholly uncalled for; and when they observe that he says what he does notwithstanding that Mr. Mill, in his volume on Comte published a year later, utters substantially the same opinion as in his letter, they will think his sneer without excuse. To strengthen his case Mr. Harrison seeks to override the verdict of Mr. Mill by that of