to morals. And yet it must be considered doubtful whether, by the authority of ministers of religion or by the experience of the individual conscience, religion has ever originated an ethical principle. We have seen above that the hypothesis of a supernatural divine revelation is not necessary in order to explain the existence of our ethical principles and practices. We have also seen further that these principles and practices have their origin in general not in man's feeling toward the divine, but in his intercourse with his fellow-creatures. There seems to be no rule of ethical usage among us that does not finally go back to our view of its bearing on the well-being of society. This last is the final standard by which we test all our arguments on moral questions. If we wish to decide on the desirableness of flogging on board ships, we ask whether it maintains discipline better than any other punishment, and how it affects the character of the sailor, it being assumed that the proper development of the individual is an essential element of social progress. In the same way we treat all disciplinary problems—capital punishment, solitary confinement, corporal chastisement by parents and teachers: we inquire into the effect on the individual, but the individual as a member of society. We recognize individual rights, but we do not hesitate to sacrifice them to the welfare of the whole. No sympathy with a culprit affects us if we believe that the good of the community requires his punishment. An argument which demonstrates the best social good is considered final. In the prohibition controversies the only point really considered by the disputants is, Does prohibition prohibit? Is war lawful? The answer is given by appeal to the necessities of national life.
But how is it with cases of priestly legislation? Are they not contributions of religion to ethics? In all such cases I believe it will be found that the ethical principle involved is one which has already been established by society and is only applied by religion. As an example let us take the institution of taboo, whose usages are so widely spread in civilized as well as uncivilized countries. Taboo sets certain things apart as sacred or as the special property of gods or men, not to be owned or used by others. Obviously an ethical principle enters here, since the use of tabooed objects by the community becomes wrong; and, as taboo is an essentially religious idea, it may be said that religion has here established a moral rule. But let us see whether this is really the case. The customs of taboo are of two sorts, those which relate to the gods and to persons and places consecrated to their worship, and those which relate to ordinary social intercourse.
The reverence required for images of deities, for sacred buildings and their furniture and ministers, is of course a purely re-
