Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 4.djvu/517

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Prof. A. P. Peabody, D. D., Cambridge, Mass. III. Deep-Sea Exploration, by Prof. Wm. B. Carpenter, M. D., LL. D., F. R. S., London. IV. Universal Education, by Ray Palmer, D. D., New York. V. The Prussian Church Law, by Baron Franz von Holtzendorff, LL. D., Munich. VI. International Arbitration, by Theodore D. Woolsey, D. D., LL. D., New Haven.

It is always unfair to judge a periodical enterprise like this by its first number; for, although, in the present case, there has been long preparation, nothing can compensate for want of experience and the advantages of public criticism. The present number contains much good reading, although it is rather the opposite of lively. Half its articles are by D. D.'s, which gives promise that it is to be safely and conservatively conducted. This is important, as we must have ratchet-gear to hold what the driving impulses of advancing thought have gained. Yet it is very easy to pass from conservation to obstruction; and the somewhat spiteful kick given to Prof. Bain for his little book on "Mind and Body," while it seems to indicate the whereabouts of the International, suggests also that its editor may be in danger of overlooking the above distinction. The position taken being important as a symptom of the future course of the Review, it is worthy of some remark.

The school of mental philosophy, of which Bain is a leading representative, diners from the old metaphysical school in considering mind and body together, in their connections, interactions, and dependencies; and in maintaining that there can be no true mental philosophy without taking both factors into account. The old metaphysicians attended to the one and neglected the other; and what was worse, they magnified the one and decried the other, drawing perpetual contrasts between spiritual mind and "mere brute matter." An undoubted and very important step forward has been made in the scientific study of both orders of phenomena, as we find them related in Nature and in fact. Modern psychology, indeed, differs from the old metaphysics simply in conquering its prejudices, in taking into account all the elements of the problem, and treating them by the scientific method. Very naturally, the special work to be done has been to bring forward and assign its proper place to the neglected element, matter; whereupon the partisans of the old view make an endless ado about the encroachments of Materialism. When Prof. Bain refers to the structure of the brain, in the albuminous tissues and corpuscles of which all our natural and acquired aptitudes are stored up, the writer in the International is offended at such a "gross form of expression," and sighs for the good old times of Reid and Stewart, who "seem like intellectual giants when compared with the Professor of Aberdeen."

The writer observes that "nothing is more certain than our ability to separate mental and physical phenomena," and he might have added that bullets, strychnine, and lightning, are the most effectual means of doing it. But, when the separation is effected, mental phenomena disappear, and there is, therefore, an end to the study of mind. Of mental phenomena dissociated from physical phenomena we know absolutely nothing. If the writer means that "nothing is more certain than our ability to separate mental and physical phenomena" for the purpose of inquiring into their nature and laws, then we say that nothing is more false than the statement. We know nothing of mind, except as limited and conditioned by association with matter. The mode of union is a mystery, but the fact of union and of unity is undeniable. The very essence of the mystery is the oneness of that which exhibits such widely-different effects. The animate organism manifests at the same time psychical and material properties. We may confine our attention to either, Or to parts of either, but we cannot separate them. Theory after theory has been offered for thousands of years to explain the relation. Science takes things as it finds them, and occupies itself in tracing the relations and dependencies among the phenomenal effects. This is Prof. Bain's method, and he has made it his great task to bring forward the long-neglected corporeal side of the inquiry, and to include the body in the study of the mind. Metaphysics does not require this, but science does require it, and the later