Its defenders have not come before the world with a ready-made and fully developed doctrine, thought out into all its consequences and tested in all its applications. It is just the tentative and provisional nature of many expositions of pragmatism which makes it hard to grasp its meaning unequivocally. It seems to change Proteus-like, under our hands, just when we think we have held it fast and pinned it down. The very formulations of its doctrines are perplexingly numerous, and not always, on the face of them, consistent with each other.
There is undoubtedly some truth in this accusation, but the reason why such a condition exists is not far to seek.
It is well known to all who have ever attempted to make them that definitions and rules in any science or branch of study are always exceedingly difficult to frame. Though studied first by the student, they are necessarily formulated last. Dr. Schiller says:
Real definitions are a standing difficulty for all who have to deal with them, whether as logicians or as scientists. . . . For a real definition, to be adequate, really involves a complete knowledge of the thing defined. And of what subject of scientific interest can we flatter ourselves to have complete knowledge?
Only a moment's reflection will convince us that this is true. Definitions must necessarily delimit and restrict, consequently with the growth of knowledge they become insufficient and obsolete. The discovery of one new fact may invalidate and completely overthrow a definition that may have passed current and remained unchallenged for years. In other words, "new facts burst old rules" and definitions, both are man-made products, so it should never be forgotten that definitions and "rules are made for man, not man for rules" and definitions. No science is finished, none can be called exact, all are in the process of formation. To illustrate. Who can define matter, or ether, or electricity? Of how much value now are many of the definitions in physics or chemistry of ten, or even five, years ago? All definitions, then, at least along scientific lines or in any living, growing branch of study, should be regarded as provisional only, true only up to date, and, like railroad schedules, subject to change without notice to the public. They should be treated as useful working tools, but liable any day to be superseded by better instruments. All this applies with especial force to a "new philosophy," still in the embryonic or chrysalis state. Since "the pragmatic movement,—so-called," according to Professor James, "seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air," it ought not to be a matter of surprise that there is not entire agreement even among the pragmatists themselves. It would be an easy task to set forth various points of difference, as well as apparent, if not real, contradictions, among those who have grasped their pens, even if they can not be said to have drawn their swords, and hastened to do battle in its defense. In doing this, however, we should only be following in the wake of the
