logical problem some years since in an address that I was permitted to give before the Psychological Association. I venture to emphasize this problem afresh and to declare that it is a problem which the whole pragmatist controversy has itself especially emphasized and has not yet adequately solved.
Again I have called attention to the difference between vaguely estimated confidence and objective probability. Here is a problem that once more presents psychological aspects. I shall have no time to discuss them upon this occasion. The psychology of probability is, however, to my mind one full of very interesting problems.
III
I have thus enumerated three of the psychological problems which to my mind are emphasized by the course of the pragmatistic discussion. That these problems come to my mind with a special force because of my logical interest, you see. It is now my purpose to appeal to yon as psychologists or as students interested in the subject, to follow for a few moments some further characterization especially of the first of these psychological problems. I am dissatisfied in the recent discussions of the psychology of reasoning with what seems to be a failure to understand what takes place in exact deductive procedure. The current prejudices as well as the hoary traditions on this subject seem to conspire to call the attention of students away from the center of the problem. Without attempting to give any adequate summary of Professor Pillsbury's account of the reasoning process in his recent "Psychology of Reasoning," I may attempt by a few references to indicate how inadequate some current views are to take account of what the deductive process actually is. In Professor Pillsbury's "Psychology of Reasoning," he distinguishes pretty sharply between the two processes of inference and proof. By inference, if I understand him, he means the process whereby a conclusion is suggested in such wise as to arouse more or less belief. By proof he means a process whereby this belief is more or less adequately tested. Now logicians are accustomed to use the word inference in a somewhat different way from that which Professor Pillsbury emphasizes. And what this way is I shall try to point out in a moment. But laying inference aside for the moment, and passing to the other side of the reasoning process as Professor Pillsbury defines it, namely to the process of proof, the only form of deductive proof which Professor Pillsbury seems to emphasize is the one that has received its traditional description in the doctrine of the syllogism. The essence of the traditional syllogism is, according to Professor Pillsbury, that the general major premise is supposed to aid us in testing our belief in the conclusion, by virtue of the fact that in the minor premise something
