Page:Prerogatives of the Crown.djvu/22

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2 Legislative and Ej^ectiiive Authorities. [Ch. I. and his intellect expanded, the necessity of establishing a sys- tem of laws and subordination, and of placing somewhere the power of commanding and enforcing obedience, became appa- rent. In the rudeness of his uncultivated sense, man ever adopts the most obvious means. Simple rules of action were adopted; and he whose superior prowess in battle, or address, in their little assemblies, had won tlieir highest estimation, was naturally appointed their leader and governor. Even in its infancy subordination assumed various forms. Time, acci- dent, the progressive increase of mankind, and the diversified extent of the mental feelings and capacities of different na- tions, have rendered the forms of government more nume- rous and complicated. To explain the various merits and demerits of the different forms of government which now exist, is foreign to the scope and intention of this Treatise. It may, however, be observed, that as on the one hand a despotic monarchical form of govern- ment degrades the native freedom and dignity of man ; so, on the other hand, the republican system, if it do not expose the people to the worst species of despotism, tends to create endless anarchy and confusion in the State. The rights of sovereignty, or supreme power, are of a le- gislative and executive nature, and must, under any form of government, be vested exclusively in a body or bodies, dis- tinct from the people at large. In this country, the legisla- tive and executive authorities are wisely placed in different hands : the power of making laws being allotted to the King, Lords, and Commons, who constitute the Parliament; and the right to administer and execute them being assigned to the King, who in his political capacity of supreme executive magistrate, must in general consider the laws, not his own will, as the criterion of his conduct. That government is arbitrary in which the legislative and executive departments are inseparable ; but when firmly and inalienably secured in separate hands, the different branches of government operate as a check on each other, and form that mixed monarchical constitution which has been considered by most writers on political subjects to be best calculated to secure the happiness and liberty of the subject. The executive power could not exist if the King had no share in the legislative authority ; which would in such case make