of parliament should at such an era speak against the liberties of the refugees. Yet a fraternal feeling may have contributed to the excellence of the oratory on the side of hospitality and equity. The English shopkeepers were willing to allow the foreign refugees to manufacture goods and to supply them wholesale; but they were bent upon shutting up the retail-shops of all foreigners.
The Burghley Papers (see Strype, vol. iii., page 543, and Appendix, No. 59) preserve the substance of a speech on the right side of the question, which (as the wrong side at other times has produced so much discreditable literature), I copy in full, premising that the honourable member to whom it was a reply had just finished his contribution to the debate by affirming the maxim, that we obey every precept of charity by a patriotic and exclusive affection to our own fellow countrymen [Omnes omnium charitates una patria complexa est].
A Speech in Parliament, anno 1588, upon a Bill against Strangers and Aliens Selling Wares bv Retail. This Bill, as I conceive, oftereth to the consideration of this honourable House a controversy between the natural born subject of this realm, and a stranger inhabiting among us. Surely, before I proceed any further, I find myself doubly affected and doubly distracted. For, on the one side, the very name of my country and nation is so pleasant in mine ears and so delightful in my heart, that I am compelled to subscribe unto him who, having rehearsed all the degrees of conjunction and society, concludeth thus, omnes omnium charitates una Patria complexa est. Insomuch that in this case, wherein my country is a part, and especially that part of my country [London] which as it is the head of the body, so ought it by me to be most honoured and loved, methinks I might needs judge myself to be no competent judge in this cause. But on the other side, in the person of the stranger, I consider the miserable and afflicted state of these poor exiles, who, together with their countries have lost all (or the greatest) comforts of this life, and, for want of friends, lie exposed to the wrongs and injuries of the malicious and ill-affected. The condition of strangers is that they have many harbours but few friends (multa hospitia, paucos amicos). In these respects I am moved with an extraordinary commiseration of them, and feel in myself a sympathy and fellow-suffering with them. But in the third place, I look on myself, or rather into myself, and as I am in myself, which is nothing but as I am intended here to be, which is more than I can be, though no more than I ought to be, as in the place of a judge. In every cause it is the part of the judge to hunt after the truth, to thrust aftection off, to open the door to reason, and to give judgment with respect to the matters in hand and without respect of persons (Judicis est in causis verum sequi, seponere affectum, admittere rationem, ex rebus ipsis non ex personis judicare).[1]
And therefore I pray you that I may lay before you my judgment in the matter, as I have declared my affection to the parties. The bill requireth that it be enacted that no aliens-born, being neither denizens nor having served as apprentices by the space of seven years, should sell any wares by retail.
Because it is required that this be made a law, let us consider how it may stand, first, with the grounds and foundations of all laws (which are the laws of nature and the Law of God), and secondly, with the profit and commodity of the commonwealth.
I will not detain you with mathematical or philosophical discourses concerning the earth and man and man’s residence thereon. The whole earth, being but a point in the centre of the world, will admit no division of dominions; punctum est indivisible. Man (as Plato saith) is no earthly, but a heavenly creature, and therefore hath caput tanquam radicem infixum caelo. The residence or continuence of one nation in one place is not of the law of nature, which (being in itself immutable) would admit no transmigration of people or transplantations of nations. But I will propound unto you two grounds of nature, as more proper to this purpose. One is that we should give to others the same measure that we would receive from them, which is the golden rule of justice, and the other is that we ought by all good means to
- ↑ The orator seems to have paid his audience the compliment of leaving the Latin quotations untranslated. Perhaps the transcriber ought to apologize to his readers for occasionally interpolating a translation.
