disposal. He pays at present 27 battalions, 4 companies of his guards, 2 regiments of cavalry and 3 of dragoons; and we may estimate his effective force at 15,000 foot and 2500 horse. The Spanish have 8000 foot and 3000 horse; the Imperialists, 8000 foot and 4500 horse. Thus, we may reckon on 30,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (of whom we must leave in the Milanese, in the quarters of the Imperialists, and in the fortresses of Piedmont, at least 8000 infantry and 1000 horse); so that we may bring into the field about 30,000 men. Under the orders of Monsieur Catinat, in the provinces bordering on the Alps, there are 50,000 foot and 4000 or 5000 horse, without reckoning the ‘Troupes de la Marine,’ who are in Provence under the orders of Monsieur de Tourville, and will not leave the coasts.
“If our affairs were directed by a single and skilful head, we should at least be able to give some annoyance to the enemy. But though our chiefs are men of great merit, and perfectly well-intentioned, they cannot think alike, nor have they the same interests. And it were to be wished, that we had generals of greater experience.
“We are at present engaged in projects for the siege of Casale, for it is true that if we do not undertake it, there is great appearance that we shall spend this campaign (as we did the other) without doing anything. But it is certain that if we finish our lines, and establish a blockade as we ought, we shall soon be masters of it without expense, without loss of men, and without risk. And if we persist in the design of besieging[1] it, we shall encounter many difficulties, we shall lose many men and much time; and the enemy in the interim will take Demont, which will give them a third entrance into Piedmont. It is even to be feared that in the later season they may still farther avail themselves of the weakness to which the siege will have previously reduced our infantry.
“However, since it has been determined to undertake the siege (though I was of a contrary opinion), I urge our generals as much as possible to adopt a decided part; for in speaking perpetually of the siege, we forget the lines and take no measures as elsewhere. I much fear, indeed, that we shall not finish the lines, and shall pass the campaign in the vicinity of Casale. After that, if the enemy choose to attempt anything in Piedmont, we shall not find ourselves in a condition to oppose them, because we shall have adopted no measure for our subsistence in that quarter.
“Such, my Lord, is the present state of our affairs. I will do myself the honour of sending you a regular account. And I humbly beg you to impart your sentiments to me, that I may regulate my conduct for the service of the king and the advantage and prosperity of the nation.”[2]
The desires and projects of the different leaders formed a strange medley. The Duke of Savoy’s whole attention was directed to the fortresses of Casale and Pignerol. The Austrians and Spaniards concentrated their fondness on Italy. Lord Galway’s programme was that the land forces should combine with the British fleet to assault Marseilles or Toulon, with a view to the destruction of the French navy and shipping. Being outvoted in a council of war, he next proposed the siege of Nice, but this proposal was also rejected. The operation which was sanctioned was contrary to the sense of the majority, namely, an assault upon Casale. Lord Galway disapproved of the scheme, on the ground that the progressing blockade would compel that fortress to surrender without any sacrifice of men and means.
While the army were making creditable preparations for the assault, the fact was that the French had agreed privately with the Duke of Savoy that the fortress, after being dismantled, should be evacuated by them and handed over to the Duke of Mantua. The form of taking the place by storm was, however, to be enacted. This does not detract from the valour and diligence of the officers and soldiers, for they doubted not that the Duke was in earnest. Lord Galway’s letter was written in the midst of the preparations. After a fortnight’s siege, on the 11th of July, the garrison capitulated.
The biographer of King William records the following incidents connected with the execution of the capitulation:— “In the execution of the capitulation, it plainly appeared that the Duke of Savoy began to lean on the French side. For he not only suffered them to work very slowly on the demolishing the fortifications of Casale, whereby the forces of the allies were hindered from entering upon some other considerable enterprise, but also allowed them several things out of the public magazines, which of right belonged to the confederates. The Lord Galway, who commanded His Britannic Majesty’s forces in Piedmont, was so disgusted with these proceedings that, having been left before Casale with several battalions to see the capitulation performed, he retired' to Turin to make his complaints to the Duke; nor could he be persuaded to go back till he was assured by His Royal Highness that no wrong should be done to the Emperor or any of his allies.”
While Lord Galway’s letters to the Duke of Shrewsbury have been collected and printed by Archdeacon Coxe, his more official correspondence with Mr. Blathwait,
