simpler than these," says Nietzsche. Lotze ("Logik," p. 552) expresses himself in regard to this as follows: "Thought, left to the logical laws of its movement, encounters once more at the end of its regularly traversed course the things suppressed or hidden."
5 Compare the remarks of Baldwin following in text. The eccentric philosopher Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88) even places intelligence and speech as identical (see Hamann's writings, pub. by Roth, Berlin 1821). With Nietzsche intelligence fares even worse as "speech metaphysics" (Sprachmetaphysik). Friedrich Mauthner goes the furthest in this conception ("Sprache und Psychologie," 1901). For him there exists absolutely no thought without speech, and speaking is thinking. His idea of the "fetish of the word" governing in science is worthy of notice.
6 Compare Kleinpaul: "Das Leben der Sprache," 3 Bände. Leipzig 1893.
7 "Jardin d'Épicure," p. 80.
8 It is difficult to calculate how great is the seductive influence of the primitive word–meaning upon a thought. "Anything which has even been in consciousness remains as an affective moment in the unconscious," says Hermann Paul ("Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte," 4th ed., 1909, p. 25). The old word-meanings have an after-effect, chiefly imperceptible, "within the dark chamber of the unconscious in the Soul" (Paul). J.G. Hamann, mentioned above, expresses himself unequivocably: "Metaphysics reduces all catchwords and all figures of speech of our empirical knowledge to empty hieroglyphics and types of ideal relations." It is said that Kant learned some things from Hamann.
9 "Grundriss der Psychologie," p. 365.
10 "Lehrbuch der Psychologie," X, 26.
11 James Mark Baldwin: "Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic."
12 In this connection I must refer to an experiment which Eberschweiler (Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie, 1908) has made at my request, which discloses the remarkable fact that in an association experiment the intrapsychic association is influenced by phonetic considerations ("Untersuchungen über den Einfluss der sprachlichen Komponente auf die Assoziation," Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie, 1908).
13 So at least this form of thought appears to Consciousness. Freud says in this connection ("The Interpretation of Dreams," tr. by Brill, p. 418): "It is demonstrably incorrect to state that we abandon ourselves to an aimless course of ideas when we relinquish our reflections, and allow the unwilled ideas to emerge. It can be shown that we are able to reject only those end-presentations known to us, and that immediately upon the cessation of these unknown or, as we inaccurately say, unconscious end-presentations come into play which now determine the course of the unwilled ideas—a thought without end-presentation cannot be produced through any influence we can exert on our own psychic life."
14 "Grundriss der Psychologie," p. 464.
15 Behind this assertion stand, first of all, experiences taken from the field of the normal. The undirected thinking is very far removed from "meditation," and especially so as far as readiness of speech is concerned. In psychological experiments I have frequently found that the
