Qualifications for President and the “Natural Born” Citizenship Eligibility Requirement
The Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark cited with approval to an earlier decision of a federal circuit court, written by Supreme Court Justice Swayne sitting on circuit, explaining that
All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as in England…. We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject to the same exceptions, since before the Revolution.[1]
The underlying opinions and reasoning of the Attorney General in 1862 (citing the historical intent, understanding, and common law principles relating to citizenship), the federal appellate court opinion written by Supreme Court Justice Swayne in 1866, and the detailed discussion of citizenship and the holding by the Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark in 1898, citing to judicial precedents such as The Charming Betsey (1804); Inglis v. Sailor’s Snug Harbor (1830), McCreery v. Somerville (1824), and Lynch v. Clarke (1844), have been regularly confirmed and supported by later Supreme Court and other federal court decisions finding that the two general categories of “citizens” are: (1) those who are “natural born” citizens, that is, those who are citizens “by birth” or “at birth,” including all native born citizens, and (2) those who were born “aliens” and must be “naturalized” to be citizens.[2] As explained by the Supreme Court in 1998:
There are “two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.” United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898). Within the former category, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees that every person “born in the United States, subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.” 169 U.S. at 702. Persons not born in the United States acquire citizenship by birth only as provided by Acts of Congress. Id. at 703.[3]
The interpretation that one who obtains “citizenship by birth” is a “natural born” citizen eligible to be President, as distinguished from one who derives “citizenship by naturalization” and who is not so eligible, was discussed by the Supreme Court as early as 1884:
The distinction between citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization is clearly marked in the provisions of the Constitution, by which “no person, except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall
- ↑ 169 U.S. at 662–663, citing United States v. Rhodes, 27 Fed. Case 785 (No. 16151) (C.C. Ky. 1866).
- ↑ Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101 (1884); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828 (1971); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1963); MacIntosh v. United States, 42 F.2d 845, 848 (2nd Cir. 1930); Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. den. 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Mustata v. U.S. Department of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1019 (6th Cir. 1999); Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F.Supp. 1144, 1145–1146 (ND Cal. 2008); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F.Supp. 63, 66 (D.N.H 2008); note also state court in Ankeny v. Governor of the State of Indiana, 916 NE2d 678 (2009), petition to transfer jurisdiction denied (Ind. Supreme Court, April 5, 2010).
- ↑ Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423–424 (1998). See also Scalia, J. and Thomas, J., concurring: “The Constitution ‘contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.’” When one is born “in” the United States and “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States that person becomes a citizen “at birth,” that is, “becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.” 523 U.S. at 461, citing Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 702.
clarifying some confusion that might have arisen from dicta in an earlier Supreme Court case (The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36, 73 (1874)). 169 U.S. at 687, 693.
