only when the circumstances clearly warrant its imposition. The unavoidable rhetorical question in sentencing you today is, if not here, then when?
[183]The need to make an order that you serve your sentence without parole does not primarily arise from deterrence nor from the need to protect the community from you, powerful as both considerations are when dealing with an offender capable of such terrible crimes and the necessity of delivering a cogent message that the commission of such an atrocity will be met with the most condign response. However, I am mindful that as the years pass and you become a much older man, the risk you pose could be reassessed. The need for deterrence is also clear but the deluded motivation of zealots capable of such crimes, with their overvalued beliefs that feed such extreme violence, are less likely to be tempered by the fear of penal consequences no matter how severe.
[184]Your crimes, however, are so wicked that even if you are detained until you die, it will not exhaust the requirements of punishment and denunciation.[1] Those legitimate penological grounds for continued detention will remain.[2] At nearly 30 years of age, you are a relatively young man and the justifications for your continued detention over time may shift as the years pass. Some may change but I do not consider, however long the length of your incarceration during your lifetime, that it could, even in a modest way, atone for what you have done. Ordinarily such an approach would be a poor guarantee of just and proportionate punishment, but I consider yours is one of those exceedingly rare cases which is different.
[185]For completeness, I record that if I am wrong to sentence you on the basis that the Court retains a residual discretion to decide whether to impose a life sentence without parole, despite having concluded that no minimum term of imprisonment would be sufficient to hold you to account for the harm you have done, or to denounce your conduct, a whole-of-life sentence would have to follow in any event. In the
- ↑ At [181]–[183].
- ↑ Sentencing Act, s 103(2). Regina v McLoughlin [2014] EWCA Crim 188, [2014] 1 WLR 3964 at [14]–[17], citing Lord Judge CJ in Regina v Oakes [2012] EWCA Crim 2435, [2013] QB 979 at [9]–[10], summarising the views expressed by Lord Bingham CJ in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [1998] QB 751 (QB) at 769, and by Lord Steyn in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [2001] 1 AC 410 (HL) at 417.
