far-reaching results. But the confidence which it gave to the Sikhs did not save them from a disastrous defeat the following year, when the Mahárájá, believing that, with Fateh Khán absent and the Afgháns demoralised, he might seize Kashmír as an easy prey, massed an army at Siálkot on the plains below Jammu and prepared to march on the valley. Diwán Mokham Chand, the great general, was ill, and indeed died a few months later. He had strongly dissuaded the Mahárájá from the undertaking, urging that the time was inopportune, the hill Rájás hostile, and the commissariat and transport insufficient. But the Mahárájá would listen to no advice. He took charge of one division himself, and entrusted another to Diwán Rám Dyál, a gallant young man, a grandson of Mokham Chand, who had already won his spurs in several engagements. Rájá Agar Khán of Rajáori, where the army first halted, gave the Mahárájá the advice to divide his force, one half under himself to proceed by way of Punch, and the other under Rám Dyál by the Bahramgalla route. The plan, which may have been necessary from the difficulties of transport on hill roads, had the unfortunate result that the one division could not render any assistance to the other, and that an active enemy could destroy both in detail. This was done by the governor of Kashmír. He attacked Rám Dyál with his whole force as the Sikhs, thoroughly exhausted by a fatiguing march, descended from the Pír Panjál pass into the valley. Rám Dyál fought well, but was overpowered
