Alito, J., dissenting
I will assume for the sake of argument that Reed’s claim accrued when the CCA issued its “authoritative construction of Article 64,” but I cannot agree with Reed’s argument—which the Court conspicuously declines to defend—that the CCA’s interpretation did not become “authoritative” until rehearing was denied.
Reed cites no authority for the proposition that the filing of a petition for rehearing typically suspends the authoritative force of an appellate court’s decision, and in fact, it appears that the opposite is true—as this Court’s “GVR” practice illustrates. On or shortly after the day when we hand down a decision, we often “GVR” cases in which petitions raising similar issues are pending before us. (That is, we grant the petition, vacate the decision below, and remand the case for reconsideration in light of the decision we have handed down.) On June 30, 2022, for example, we did this in no fewer than 33 cases.[1] We do not wait to see if a petition for rehearing will be filed; nor do we hold off until a mandate is issued or a certified copy of the judgment is prepared. See this Court’s Rules 45.2 and 45.3. If our decisions did not become authoritative and binding as soon as they are issued, this practice would be impermissible.
There is no reason why decisions of the CCA should be viewed any differently. On the contrary, it appears that the CCA has followed a practice similar to our GVR practice. See Oliver v. State, 872 S. W. 2d 713, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (vacating judgment and remanding for reconsideration in light of decision on same day). And neither Reed nor the Court has cited any contrary Texas authority. Accordingly, Reed’s “authoritative construction” argument became complete, at the latest, when the CCA adopted that construction on April 12, 2017, two years and 11 months before Reed filed his §1983 complaint.
- ↑ Journal of the Supreme Court 711–716 (June 30, 2022); see, e.g., id., at 685–689 (June 27, 2022) (granting, vacating, and remanding 28 cases).
