Page:Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs (Volume Two).djvu/46

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34
SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

assigned for debate upon that subject. Mr. Shellabarger was logical and effective but he was destitute of imagination utterly. At the bar since his retirement from politics he has enjoyed a large practice, but, unfortunately, as it appears to me, he has preserved the style of speaking which he acquired upon the stump and in Congress. A skillful speaker must adapt himself to the circumstances and to his audience. A stump speech, a speech in the House of Representatives, a speech in the Senate, an argument to a court, an argument to a jury, should each be framed on a model of its own. Neither style will answer for any other. The degree of variance may not be considerable and with a well disciplined person the change may not be apparent. Mr. Webster adapted himself to every audience, but the changes were slight. Yet there were changes. He was not over solemn in the Supreme Court, and he was never boisterous when he addressed the multitude. As far as I recollect my positions and arguments in the debates upon the counting of the electoral votes, I now discard all that I then said. My present conclusion is that upon a reasonable construction of the Constitution there is no occasion for legislation or for an amendment to the fundamental law. The Vice-President or the President of the Senate is the president of the convention. He carries into the chair the ordinary powers of a presiding officer. He rules upon all questions that arise. He may and should rule upon the various certificates that are sent up by the several States. If, in any case, his ruling is objected to, the two Houses separate, and each House votes upon the question:— “Shall the ruling of the Chair stand, etc.” If the Houses divide, the ruling is sustained. The president and one House are a majority. The decision is in accordance with our system of government. The suggestion that the president or that the Houses may act under the influence of personal or political prejudice, may, with equal force, be urged against