Page:Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election.pdf/58

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U.S. Department of Justice

Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)

them to PP  account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU-controlled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud-based account.[1]

2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections

In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and country governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities.[2] The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware, such as voter registration software and election polling stations.[3] The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity.

By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as "SQL injection," by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents).[4] In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters,[5] and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified.[6]

GRU officers Investigative Technique  scanned state and local websites for vulnerabilites. For example, over a two-day period in July 2016, GRU officers Investigative Technique  for vulnerabilities on websites of more than two dozen states. Investigative Technique 

  1. Netyksho Indictment ¶ 34; see also SM-2589105-HACK, serial 29Investigative Technique
  2. Netyksho Indictment ¶ 69.
  3. Netyksho Indictment ¶ 69.Investigative Technique 
  4. Investigative Technique 
  5. Investigative Technique 
  6. Investigative Technique