Page:Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 1.pdf/19

   
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

	including attempted Domain Name System (DNS) lookups and potentially malicious emails, some dating back to January 2016.[1]
State 15	(U) State 15 officials were not aware that the state was among those targeted until they were notified.[2] State 15's current lead election official was not in place during the 2016 election so they had little insight into any scanning or attempted intrusion on their systems. State 15 officials said that generally they viewed 2016 as a success story because the attempted infiltration never got past the state's four layers of security.   DHS reported broad GRU scanning activity on State 15 government domains.[3]
State 16	(U) According to State 16 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified in the October FLASH conducted scanning activity against a state government network.[4]   DHS reported information on GRU scanning activity based on a self-report from State 16 after the issuance of the October FLASH.[5]
State 17	(U) State 17 officials reported nothing "irregular, inconsistent, or suspicious" leading up to the election.[6] While State 17 IT staff received an MS-ISAC notification, that notification was not shared within the state government.[7]   DHS reported GRU scanning activity on an election-related domain.[8]
State 18	(U) State 18 election officials said they observed no connection from the IP addresses listed in the election-related notifications.[9]   DHS reported indications of GRU scanning activity on a State 18 government domain.[10]
State 19	(U) According to State 19 officials, cyber actors using infrastructure identified in October by MS-ISAC conducted scanning activity. State 19 claimed this activity was "blocked," but did not elaborate on why or how it was blocked.[11]

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1. (U/ ) DHS IIR 4 019 0012 17, Cyber Activity Targeting [State 14] Government Networks from Internet Protocol Addresses Associated with Targeting State Elections Systems, October 21, 2016.
2. Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 15], March 12, 2018.
3. (U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
4. Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 16], December 1, 2017.
5. (U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
6. Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 17], January 25, 2018.
7. (U) Ibid.
8. (U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
9. Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 18], December 8, 2017.
10. (U) DHS briefing for Committee staff on March 5, 2018.
11. Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 19], December 1, 2017.

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COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY