Page:Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 1.pdf/25

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COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

 [1]  [2]  [3]

 [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]

(U) FBI and DHS Interactions with State 2[8]
August 18, 2016 (U) FBI FLASH notification identified IP addresses targeting election offices.[9]
August 24, 2016 (U) State 2 Department of State received the FLASH from National Association of Secretaries of State.[10]
August 26, 2016 (U) State 2 Department of State forwarded FLASH to counties and advised them to block the IP addresses.[11]

  Separately,   determined one of the listed IP addresses scanned its systems.[12]   subsequently discovered suspected intrusion activity and contacted the FBI.[13]


  1. (U) Ibid.
  2. (U) Ibid.
  3. (U) Ibid.
  4.   DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25, 2018, pp. 7.
  5. (U) Ibid.
  6.   Ibid. See also EB-0004893-LED.
  7. (U) SSCI interview with DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, p. 42.
  8.   DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25, 2018, pp. 7.
  9. (U) FBI FLASH, Alert Number T-LD1004-TT, TLP-AMBER,  
  10.   DTS 2018-2416; FBI Briefing on [State 2] Election Systems, June 25, 2018, p. 4.
  11. (U) Ibid., pp. 4-5.
  12. (U) Ibid., p. 5.
  13. (U) Ibid.

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COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY