COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
- (U) State 2's Secretary of State and Election Director told the Committee in December 2017 that there was "never an attack on our systems." "We did not see any unusual activities. I would have known about it personally."[1] State 2 did not want to share with the Committee its cybersecurity posture, but state officials communicated that they are highly confident in the security of their systems.[2]
- (U) State 2's election apparatus is highly decentralized, with each county making its own decisions about acquiring, configuring, and operating election systems.[3]
- (U) As of August 9, 2018, DHS was complimentary of the steps State 2 had taken to secure its voting systems, including putting nearly all counties on the ALBERT sensor system, joining the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), and using congressionally appropriated funds plus additional state funds to hire cybersecurity advisors.[4]
- C. (U) Russian Efforts to Research U.S. Voting Systems, Processes, and Other Elements of Voting Infrastructure
- ↑ (U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 2], December 1, 2017.
- ↑ (U) Ibid.
- ↑ (U) Ibid.
- ↑ (U) DTS 2018-2581, Memorandum for the Record, Telephone call with DHS, August 9. 2018.
- ↑ GBI LHM,
- ↑ (U) Ibid., p. 5.
- ↑ Note: "FISA" refers to electronic surveillance collected on a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. This collection could have come from landlines, electronic mail accounts, or mobile phones used by personnel at a foreign embassy (i.e., an "establishment" FISA) or used by personnel associated with a foreign power (i.e., "agents of a foreign power"). This FISA collection would have been approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), effectuated by FBI, and then could also have been shared with NSA or CIA, or both, depending on the foreign target.
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COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
