COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
voting machines.[1] When those funds are spent, Congress should evaluate the results and consider an additional appropriation to address remaining insecure voting machines and systems.
- (U) DHS and other federal government entities remain respectful of the limits of federal involvement in state election systems. States should be firmly in the lead for running elections. The country's decentralized election system can be a strength from a cybersecurity perspective, but each operator should be keenly aware of the limitations of their cybersecurity capabilities and know how to quickly and properly obtain assistance.
- III. (U) THE ARC OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
In its review of the 2016 elections, the Committee found no evidence that vote tallies were altered or that voter registry files were deleted or modified, though the Committee and IC's insight into this is limited. Russian government-affiliated cyber actors conducted an unprecedented level of activity against state election infrastructure in the run-up to the 2016 U.S. elections. Throughout 2016 and for several years before, Russian intelligence services and government personnel conducted a number of intelligence-related activities targeting the voting process. the Committee found ample evidence to suggest that the Russian government was developing and implementing capabilities to interfere in the 2016 elections, including undermining confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and voting processes.[2]
- ↑ (U) Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 561-562.
- ↑ (U) The Committee has limited information on the extent to which state and local election authorities carried out forensic evaluation of registration databases. These activities are routinely carried out in the context of private sector breaches.
- ↑ FBI LHM,
- ↑ FBI LHM,
- ↑ DHS Homeland Intelligence Brief,
- ↑ FBI LHM,
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COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
