Page:Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 1.pdf/61

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

   
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

cybersecurity. More funds may be needed, as the allocation under the HAVA formula did not prioritize replacing vulnerable electronic-only machines.

  • (U) States should be able to use grant funds to improve cybersecurity in a variety of ways, including hiring additional IT staff, updating software, and contracting with vendors to provide cybersecurity services. "Security training funded and provided by a federal entity such as the EAC or DHS would also be beneficial in our view,"[1] an official from Illinois testified.
  • (U) Funds should also be available to defray the cost of instituting audits.
  • (U) States with vulnerable DRE machines with no paper backup should receive urgent access to funding. Dr. Halderman testified that replacing insecure paperless voting machines nationwide would cost $130 to $400 million dollars. Risk-limiting audits would cost less than S20 million a year.[2]
7.   Build a Credible  

 

 


  1. (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on Wednesday, June 21, 2017, p. 114.
  2. (U) Ibid., p. 119.

61
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY