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As was pointed out in my above-mentioned Report, the desirable time to consider effecting this betterment would be in conjunction with the seven-yearly overhaul, preparatory to plating as a condition of fitness for continued user. For instance, had the stronger steel hook been provided, in place of the 11-year-old wrought iron hook, when the wagon in question was overhauled and plated in 1932, it seems likely that this division might not have taken place.
On the other hand, if such comprehensive action is not considered to be immediately practicable, at least betterment in the shape of annealing the whole of the drawgear, to maintain, or to restore, the reliability of the weaker material, appears to be desirable forthwith, if this can be effected under proper conditions. It cannot, however, be regarded as a fully satisfactory alternative to the replacement of existing wrought iron and mild steel drawhooks and bars, which in any case should preferably be required after the end of 1937, by which time Private Owners should have completed the first seven-year General Repair Programme.
Having regard to the increasing speed of goods trains, I recommend that consideration of the practicability of some such measures, making for acceleration and betterment in the strength of wagon drawgear, be suggested to the Companies and to the Private Wagon Owners' Associations. Both from the economic and operating aspects, the question is one of considerable importance, and tightening up of the existing R.C.H. Regulations appears to be desirable, in order reasonably to ensure that, within an agreed period, a weak wrought iron drawhook, such as the one in question, will not be in service, and that annealing or normalising will also be included in future as an additional Requirement of a General Repair, preparatory to plating as a condition of continued user.
15. On the other hand, proper observance of Block Regulations would have prevented the results of this breakaway: The accident was not the outcome of forgetfulness, incapacity, or overwork, but of failure on the part of two signalmen to perform a simple and fundamental duty, together with lack of zeal and alertness on the part of a guard. It is true that only the existence of track circuiting through the Block Section would have ensured immunity, and it is a matter for serious reflection that the accident is similar in this respect to three out of the 17 which were the subject of Inquiry last year (King's Langley, Welwyn Garden City, and Oakham). But it can hardly be said that the circumstances of this case afford strong justification for protective measures of this kind.
While continuity of track circuiting through the Block Section provides the only real safeguard against such human failure as occurred in this instance, and against such effects of the breakaway of vehicles from trains not equipped with the continuous brake (the existence of which on the mineral train would also have prevented this accident), practice in this country bas primarily, and rightly, been based upon the policy of Local installation; this policy is particularly illustrated by the train-waiting track circuit in rear of the home signal, the occupation of which controls the block instruments, which are in many cases interlocked with the starting signal in rear.
The statistics for the five years 1930-34 afford confirmation. Out of 65 accidents of all characters, into which Inquiries were held during that period, 14 would probably have been prevented by equipment of this kind, but in all of these 14 cases the result would have been achieved by Local installation (six by a train-waiting track circuit; eight by track circuits elsewhere within interlocking limits), as opposed to installation right through the Block Section.
The track circuit in rear of the home signal at Shrivenham is an example of what is being done in this respect. When occupied, it prevents Line-Clear being transmitted on the block instrument. The wagons probably came to rest before the express was accepted at 5.18 a.m.; but they failed to reach this track circuit by only 100 yards, after having run for more than 17 miles. Had speed at the time of the division been only a trifle higher, they would have occupied this track circuit, and the express could not have been accepted. Perhaps this is the best illustration of the unfortunate circumstances in which this collision took place, marring the Company's outstanding record of immunity from passenger fatality in train accidents.
Finally, it is desirable to record the fact that the valuable system of intermittent Automatic Train Control, which the Company has installed over nearly 2,300 track miles of their main lines, had no bearing upon this accident; it is also
