obliged to receive in the honourable character of ambassador, the man who was the principal instrument in that scene. It would have been a less humiliation to have been obliged publicly, and in the face of Europe, to beg pardon of Bonaparte for having expressed grief at the death of that unfortunate prince, than to be obliged to hold daily conferences with one of his murderers. It was necessary, however, for the policy of Bonaparte, that Alexander should always feel his inferiority; that his mind should be fully impressed with the idea, that it was only by following the system which France should dictate, that he could entertain any hopes of gratifying his own private ambition. While he continued to act as an obedient vassal, Bonaparte allowed him to pursue some of his favourite schemes of ambition.
Although France had stipulated at the treaty of Tilsit, that Moldavia and Wallachia should be restored lo the Porte, she allowed the Russian armies still to occupy them, and pointed out a new object of ambition to Alexander in the conquest of Sweden. In consideration of those advantages, Alexander was obliged to enter completely into that system of vassalage which is called by Bonaparte, the system of the Continent; to cut off all commercial relations with Great Britain, and afterwards to declare war formally against this country. The Russian declaration of war is one of the feeblest state papers that we have ever seen. The attack of Copenhagen, and the not assisting her allies in the war, were the principal grounds of reproach against this country. His majesty’s answer to this declaration completely refuted the frivolous accusations which formed the substance of it, referred to the state papers published at the time, which justified the expedition on ground of necessary self-defence, and treated the Russian declaration as merely dictated by France. It concluded by declaring, that his majesty had no hostility to Russia, and that as soon as that power should emancipate herself from her dependance on France, the old relations of peace and friendship between the two countries might be immediately restored.
As to the attack of Copenhagen, it has been completely justified upon the principle of absolute necessity, in as much as not only the known character of Bonaparte, but positive information from Portugal, left our ministers no room to doubt, but that it was the full intention of the French ruler to unite all the fleets of the continental powers in an attack upon these islands. The opposition in parliament condemned the measure violently, on the ground of its being inconsistent with that morality for which the British nation had always been so justly distinguished. It retorted upon them by ministers, that (when in power) they did not seem to be guided by that new morality, when they attacked Constantinople, and endeavoured to carry off the Turkish fleet, nor when they seized Alexandria, nor yet when they gave instructions to Lord St. Vincent with respect to the Portuguese fleet. These recriminations were not otherwise important than as tending to shew, that the arguments employed by opposition in the course of debate, were not the
