40 In Gatto, the Victorian Court of Appeal said (at [41], [44] and [45]):
41 The question for the trier of fact, in a defamation proceeding, however, is what is the single or dominant meaning which the trier of fact believes was actually conveyed by the relevant publication—what many of the authorities in this area have referred to as the 'single meaning rule'.
…
44 As we have already observed, the issue for the trier of fact is to select the single meaning which is the 'natural and ordinary meaning' of the words published. This (the single meaning), depending on the words used and the manner of publication, may or may not be 'the approximate centre point in the range of possible meanings'. There is no uniform rule that, in every case, the natural and ordinary meaning of a publication is the centre point in the range of possible meanings. The choice of a meaning at one end of the spectrum of the range of meanings that are open, however, may well invite greater scrutiny of whether that meaning was in fact conveyed.
45 While the 'right' (single or uniform) meaning of a publication will often be 'the approximate centre point in the range of possible meanings', because a reasonable reader tries to strike a balance between the most extreme meaning that the words could have and the most innocent meaning, there is (as we have said) no uniform rule to that effect. In every case, the publication complained of must be read as a whole, in order to determine the single or uniform natural and ordinary meaning of the publication. Nothing said in Hardie (either at first instance or on appeal) gainsaid these propositions.
(Citations omitted.)
41 In the case of an article which links or associates a person with criminal or other misconduct, it may be that three levels of meanings are open. They are as follows: (1) that the person is guilty of criminal or other misconduct; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is guilty of criminal or other misconduct; and (3) that there are grounds for investigating whether the person is guilty of criminal or other misconduct (Gatley et al (2022) at para 32-006; Collins M, Collins on Defamation, (Oxford University Press, 2014) para 6.89; George P, Defamation Law in Australia (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Butterworths, 2017), at para 11.1).
42 Before leaving the statement of relevant principles, there is one other matter which should be identified. In the case of an article which links or associates a person with criminal or other misconduct, it may be appropriate to attribute to the ordinary reasonable reader knowledge of the presumption of innocence (see Lewis v Daily Telegraph at 285 per Lord Devlin; Mirror Newspapers Limited v Harrison [1982] HCA 50; (1982) 149 CLR 293 at 300–301 per Mason J (as his Honour then was)), although the circumstances of the matter complained of may be such that the ordinary reasonable reader should not be attributed with that knowledge at the time he or she reads the publication (see John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Obeid [2005] NSWCA
