tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal.
101 The other members of the High Court also referred to the relevance of the seriousness of the allegation to whether or not the court or tribunal could be satisfied of the fact alleged (at 347 per Latham CJ; at 350 per Rich J; at 353 per Starke J; and at 372 per McTiernan J).
102 Various members of the Court identified the strength of the evidence required or, approaching the matter from the other direction, the evidence which would be insufficient in the case of serious allegations. Justice Dixon said that reasonable satisfaction would not be reached "by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences" (at 362). Justice Rich said that reasonable satisfaction could not be reached "by slender and exiguous proofs or circumstances pointing with a wavering finger to an affirmative conclusion" (at 350). Justice McTiernan referred to the need for strictness of proof (at 372).
103 Another important point made in Briginshaw is that actual persuasion is required and Dixon J said that it could not be found "as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality" (at 361).
104 Chief Justice Latham said (at 343):
There is no mathematical scale according to which degrees of certainty of intellectual conviction can be computed or valued. But there are differences in degree of certainty, which are real, and which can be intelligibly stated, although it is impossible to draw precise lines, as upon a diagram, and to assign each case to a particular subdivision of certainty.
105 Finally, Dixon J said that where there is an issue in a civil proceeding as to whether a crime has been committed, the standard of proof is the same as upon other civil issues, but weight is to be given to the presumption of innocence and exactness of proof is required (at 363; see also McTiernan J at 372).
106 In Khan v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2004] 2 WLR 692 (PC) Lord Bingham of Cornhill described the presumption of innocence in the following terms (at [14]):
The presumption of innocence is perhaps the most fundamental principle underlying the administration of the criminal law. It places on the prosecution, fairly and squarely, the duty of proving guilt. …
