to suspend them from office, as in practice the appointment of a dictator depended on a senatorial decree. In brief, they usually acted as the loyal agents of the senate.
Dictatorship. — Even the dictatorship was limited in power. In 363 a dictator was appointed solely for the performance of a religious ceremony. He, to be sure, disregarded this limitation of his constitutional powers, but every subsequent dictator considered himself bound by the restrictions issued when he was appointed. Furthermore, by the third Valerian law the dictator was probably obliged to grant appeals.
The Plebeian Tribunes. — The plebeian tribunes, on the other hand, had acquired larger powers. They were originally elected to protect the humble and weak against the violence and injustice of the magistrates. This object was never attained nor was it directly attainable. But they exercised their jurisdiction especially in bringing ex-magistrates to justice for misconduct in office, and in so far served as a check on them and protected the people. Their power to secure the passage of laws was largely enhanced by the greater importance and the free action of the plebeian assembly (pp. 83-84). In addition they had obtained a seat in the senate and received the characteristic prerogative of supreme magistrates — the right to convene and consult the senate (jus cum patribus agendi). In city affairs they were to a certain extent a second supreme executive.
In their new position they no longer represented the plebeian class, but the whole people. In the course of time they lost even their popular character, — the very reason for their existence, — and became one of the most common and serviceable instruments of the senate for managing the citizens and controlling the other magistrates. Tribunician opposition to the senate was a rare occurrence, and could
