Unity of Leadership. — It was now manifest, both to the people and to the senate, — the government and the governed, — that, if the republic could still be saved, the work must begin at home with the establishment of harmony and confidence. To have accomplished this with marvelous magnanimity and abstinence from all recrimination is the imperishable glory of the senate. Taught by the disasters of the first Punic war and chastened by the recent national calamity, the senate rose to the difficulties of the situation and displayed admirable courage, firmness, energy, and tenacity of purpose. It planned campaigns and superintended their execution. Under the leadership of Fabius it remedied to a large extent the great defect of the constitution, that ordinarily there was no provision for one commander-in-chief of all the armies of the republic. This was the more necessary now, when the military dictatorship had practically broken down. Nevertheless, the senate was not always able to persuade the generals to follow its advice, and occasionally the consuls made use of their constitutional rights as commanders-in chief. The absence of a single supreme commander was, after all, one of the great causes that prolonged the war.
Reëlections and Extensions of Authority. — The senate was more successful in avoiding the annual changes of commanders, which would naturally be the result of the annual term of the magistrates. In accordance with a senatorial resolution, a plebiscite was passed as early as 217, providing that during the continuance of the war in Italy the people should have the right to reëlect ex-consuls at pleasure. After the battle at Cannae, the senate entirely controlled the consular elections, and the time began when the nobility handed down the consulship to its members in regular succession. New men were out of the question, and the old names constantly recur. Fabius and Marcus Claudius Mar-
