CHAPTER III.
“The means of the British commander-in-chief, did not enable him to equip a large land column, nor under any circumstances would it probably have been practicable to attempt an exclusive land movement, upon a point at the distance of 600 miles from his depots: an unlimited command of carriage could alone have enabled him to do so – in which case he might, probably, have advanced by the shortest and best road upon the capital, viâ Pegu and Tonghoo, turning all the enemy’s positions on the Irrawaddy, and taking him unprepared on a new line of operations, with his troops posted at a distance. It was, however, obvious, that these advantages must be sacrificed to the one great and important point of securing the river communication, for the conveyance of supplies to the army in the field, and for which purpose a combined land and water movement was determined on – the land column advancing in a direction parallel to, and at no great distance from the river, with a view to mutual co-operation and support[1].”
In the beginning of Feb. 1825, the flotilla was employed in supporting a large body of Peguers, who, in consequence of a proclamation circulated by Sir Archibald Campbell, had left Panlang and retired into the Dalla district, where they maintained so good a front, that, although followed by a Burmese force, the latter dared not to attack them.
Previous to the advance upon Ava, it was necessary to open a passage up the Lyne river, for which purpose a force was detached under Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin and Captain Chads, who captured a large stockade at Than-ta-bain, with 36 guns mounted, and destroyed an immense number of fire-
- ↑ Snodgrass, 132, et seq.
