stration. It is a right which is especially important in Russia owing to the habit of lawless and arbitrary action inveterate in Russian administration. But the representative system is quite incompetent to tackle it. According to the law, the Duma has the right to interpellate and ask questions, and the Government is bound to return answers within a month. But even supposing that an interpellation on current events preserves its interest after a month and still draws the attention of the public, which is not often the case, and supposing that the answer of the Government has proved unsatisfactory, what is the result? It is no use carrying through the Duma sweeping orders of the day expressing strong disapproval perhaps of the whole administration. The Cabinet is not responsible to the elected Chamber. The question of ministerial responsibility is, I might say, the most delicate and the most burning question of the present day in Russia, for, while concerted action is a crying need, nothing except an occasional coincidence of opinion is possible, under the present system.
But however much these obstacles hinder the working of the representative system, there remains one more obstacle to be mentioned, and that is perhaps the most serious of all. I mean the composition and working of our Upper House, the Council of Empire. I know the alternatives proposed in England under similar circumstances—although I can hardly call them "similar." "Mend it or end it." Well, we cannot possibly "end" it. "Mend" it—that sounds all right, but the Lower House cannot apply this practical remedy in Russia, because the chief features of the
