Page:S v Makwanyane and Another.djvu/34

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…the weight of the evidence indicates that the public generally has not accepted either the morality or the social merit of the views so passionately advocated by the articulate spokesmen for abolition. But however one may assess amorphous ebb and flow of public opinion generally on this volatile issue, this type of inquiry lies at the periphery - not the core - of the judicial process in constitutional cases. The assessment of popular opinion is essentially a legislative, and not a judicial, function.[1]

So too does the comment of Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.[2]

Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment

[90]The United Nations Committee on Human Rights has held that the death sentence by definition is cruel and degrading punishment. So has the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and three judges of the Canadian Supreme Court. The death sentence has also been held to be cruel or unusual punishment and thus unconstitutional under the state constitutions of Massachusetts and California.[3]

[91]The California decision is People v. Anderson.[4] Capital punishment was held by six of the


  1. Supra note 34, at 443.
  2. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
  3. The Californian Constitution was subsequently amended to sanction capital punishment.
  4. Supra note 62.