the punishment.
[87] It needs to be stressed that it is in the interests of justice that crime should be punished. As pointed out by Schreiner JA in R v Karg:
"It is not wrong that the natural indignation of interested persons and of the community at large should receive some recognition in the sentences that courts impose, and it is not irrelevant to bear in mind that if sentences for serious crimes are too lenient, the administration of justice may fall into disrepute and injured persons may incline to take the law into their own hands."[1]
[88] However, punishment that is excessive serves neither the interests of justice nor those of society. According to Brennan J,[2] punishment is excessive if it is unnecessary, and it is unnecessary "if there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted." In Gregg v Georgia,[3] Stewart J, described the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain as an aspect of excessiveness.
[89] Finally, the perceived advantages or benefits of juvenile whipping must be weighed against the rights which the provision seeks to limit. Corporal punishment involves the intentional infliction of physical pain on a human being by another human being at the instigation of the State. This is the key feature distinguishing it from other punishments. The degree of pain inflicted is quite arbitrary, depending as it does on the person who is delegated to do the whipping. The court merely directs the number of strokes to be imposed. The objective must be to penetrate the levels of tolerance to pain; the result must be a cringing fear, a terror of expectation before the whipping and acute distress which often draws involuntary screams during the infliction. There is no dignity in the act itself; the recipient might struggle against himself to maintain a semblance of dignified suffering or even unconcern; there is no dignity even in the person delivering the
