nifestly appear, lets examine the Principles of this Opinion by parts, and consider how well they make good each Member.
The first is, Whatever thinks is immaterial, and on the contrary. The conversion of this Axiom I will not examine, because it makes little to the present purpose. I will only note by the by, that I doubt not but it may be false, altho' I easily grant the Axiom it self to be true, but it is this new Method of demonstrating it I call into question, which from hence, that we can conceive Cogitation, in the mean time not conceiving Matter, concludes that Whatever thinks is Immaterial. Now that we can conceive Cogitation without conceiving Matter, they say is manifest from hence, that altho' one should suppose there were no Body in the Universe, and should not flinch from that Position, yet notwithstanding he would not cease to be certain, that there was Res cogitans, a thinking Being, in the World, he finding himself to be such, but I further add, tho' he should suppose there was no Immaterial Being in Nature, (nor indeed Material) and should not flinch from that Position, yet he would not cease to be certain that there was a thinking Being, (no not if he should suppose himself not to be a thinking Being) because he can suppose nothing without Cogitation. Which I thought worth the while to note by the by, that the great levity of the Nullibists might hence more clearly appear.
But yet I add farther, that such is the Nature of the Mind of Man, that it is like the Eye, better fitted to Contemplate other things than it self; and that therefore it is no wonder that thinking nothing of its own Essence, it does fixedly enough and intently consider in the mean time and Contemplate all ather things, yea, those very things with which she has the nearest affinity, and yet without any reflection that herself is of the like Nature. Whence it may easily come to pass, when she is so wholly taken up in Contemplating other things without any reflection upon her self, that either carelesly she may consider her self in general as a mere thinking Being, without any other attribute, or else by resolvedness afterwards, and by a force on purpose offered to her own Faculties. But that this Reasoning is wonderfully weak and trifling as to the proving of the Mind of Man to be nothing else; that is to say, to have no other attributes but meer Cogitation, there is none that does not discern.
SECT.
