Page:Saducismus Triumphatus.djvu/133

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The true Notion of a Spirit.
19

Again, if the essential Amplitude of the Soul is no greater than what may be contained within the limits of a physical Point, it cannot extend or exhibit its essential Presence through the whole Body, unless we imagine in it a stupendious velocity, such as it may be carried with in one moment into all the parts of the Body, and so be present to them: Which when it is so hard to conceive in this scant compages of an humane Body, and in the Soul occupying in one moment every part thereof, What an outragious thing is it, and utterly impossible to apprehend touching that Spirit which perpetually exhibits his essential Presence to the whole World, and what ever is beyond the World?

To which, lastly, you may add that this Hypothesis of the Holenmerians, does necessarily make all Spirits the most minute things that can be conceived: For if the whole Spirit be in every Physical point, it is plain that the essential Amplitude it self of the Spirit (which the two former Objections supposed) is not bigger than that physical Point in which it is, (which you may call, if you will, a Physical Monad) than which nothing is or can be smaller in universal Nature; Which if you'refer to any created Spirit, it cannot but seem very ridiculous; but if to the Majesty and Amplitude of the Divine Numen, intolerable, that I may not say plainly Reproachful and Blasphemous.


SECT. XIII.

A Confutation of the First Reason of the Holenmerians.

But now for the Reasons for which the Holenmerians adhere to so absurd an Opinion; verily they are such as can no ways compensate those huge Difficulties and Repugnances the Opinion it self labours under. For, for the first, which so solicitously provides for the Indivisibility of Spirits, it seems to me to undertake a Charge either Superfluous or Ineffectual. Superfluous, if extension can be without divisibility, as it is clearly demonstrated it can, in that infinite immovable Extension distinct from the movable Matter, Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 6, 7, 8.