SECT. XIX.
WHerefore I dare here appeal to the Judgment and Conscience of any one that is not altogether illiterate and of a dull and obtuse Wit, whether this Notion or Definition of a Spirit in general, is not as intelligible and perspicuous, is not as clear and every way distinct as the Idea or Notion of a Body, or of any thing else whatsoever which the mind of Man can contemplate in the whole compass of Nature. And whether he cannot as easily or rather with the same pains apprehend the Nature of a Spirit as of Body, forasmuch as they both agree in the immediate Genus to them, to wit Substance. And the Differentiæ do illustrate one another by their mutual opposition; insomuch that it is impossible that one should understand what is Material Substance, but he must therewith presently understand what Immaterial Substance is, or what it is not to have Life and Motion of it self, but he must straitway perceive what it is to have both in it self, or to be able to communicate them to others.
SECT. XX.
NOr can I divine what may be here opposed, unless haply they may alledge such things as these, That although they cannot deny but that all the terms of the Definition and Explication of them, are sufficiently intelligible, if they be considered single, yet if they be compared one with another they will mu-tually
