SECT. XXIV.
And from hence it is that because a thing is extended, they presently imagine that it has partes extra partes, and is not Ens unum per se & non per aliud, a Being one by it self, and not by vertue of another, but so framed from the juxtaposition of parts, when as the Idea of Extension precisely consider'd in it self, includes no such thing, but onely a trinal Distance, or solid Amplitude, that is to say, not linear onely and superficiary, (if we may here use those Terms which properly belong to magnitude Mathematical) but every way running out and reaching towards every part. This Amplitude surely, and nothing beside, does this bare and simple Extension include, not Penetrability nor Impenetrability, not Divisibility nor yet Indivisibility, but to either Affections or Properties, or if you will essential Differences, namely, to Divisibility and Impenetrability, or to Penetrability and Indivisibility, if considered in it self, is it altogether indifferent, and may be determined to either two of them.
Wherefore, whereas we acknowledge that there is a certain Extension, namely, Material, which is endued with so stout and invincible an Άντιτυπία or Impenetrability, that it necessarily and by an insuperable Renitency expels and excludes all other Matter that occurs and attempts to penetrate it, nor suffers it at all to enter, altho' in the simple Idea of Extension, this marvellous Vertue of it is not contained, but plainly omitted, as not at all belonging thereto immediately and of it self; why may we not as easily conceive that another Extension, namely, an Immaterial one, though Extension in it self include no such thing, is of such a Nature, that it cannot by any other thing whether Material or Immaterial be discerped into Parts; but by an indissoluble necessary and essential Tie be so united and held together with it self, that although it can penetrate all things and be penetrated by allthings,
