SECT. XVI.
THerefore briefly, Sir, I have endeavoured in these Papers, which my respect and your concernment in the Subject have made yours, to remove the main Prejudices I could think of against the Existence of Witches and Apparitions. And I'm sure I have suggested much more against what I defend, than ever I heard or saw in any that opposed it; whose Discourses for the most part, have seemed to me inspired by a lofty scorn of common belief, and some trivial Notions of vulgar Philosophy. And in despising the common Faith about matters of Fact, and fondly adhering to it in things of Speculation, they very grosly and absurdly mistake; for in things of Fact, the People are as much to be believed, as the most subtle Philosophers and Speculators; since here, Sense is the Judge, but in matters of Notions and Theory, they are not at all to be heeded, because Reason is to be Judge of these, and this they know not how to use. And yet thus it is with those wise Philosophers, that will deny the plain Evidence of the Senses of Mankind, because they cannot reconcile Appearances with the fond Crochets of a Philosophy, which they lighted on in the High-way by chance, and will adhere to at a venture. So that I profess for mine own part, I never yet heard any of the confident Declaimers against Witchcraft and Apparitions, speak any thing that might move a Mind, in any degree instructed in the generous kinds of Philosophy and Nature of things. And for the Objections I have recited, they are most of them such as rose out of mine own Thoughts, which I was obliged to consider what was possible to be said upon this occasion.
For tho' I have examined SCOT's DISCOVERY, fancying that there I should find the strong Reasons of Mens disbelief in this matter; yet I profess I met not with the least suggestion in all that Farrago, but what had been ridiculous for me to have gone about to Answer, for the Author doth little but tell odd Tales, and silly Legends, which he confutes and laughs at, and pretends this to be a Confutation of the being of Witches and Apparitions, in all which, his Reasonings are trifling and childish; and when he ventures at Philosophy, he is little better than absurd; so that it will be a
