Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Also appearing for the first time in this version of the statute was a limitation that courts could only issue the writ “within their respective jurisdictions.” This limitation forced most habeas petitions into a court with jurisdiction over the prison housing the prisoner seeking habeas relief, thus often requiring the habeas court to review and apply the law of a distant jurisdiction in which a prisoner was tried, convicted, and sentenced. Congress re-codified the habeas statute in the 1874 Revised Statutes of the United States.
A significant change to the habeas regime occurred in 1948. Congress again re-codified the habeas statute in its current location of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Congress also added to the U.S. Code a separate process for a federal inmate to file a motion to vacate the inmate’s conviction and/or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The addition of Section 2255 resolved practical difficulties created by the “within the respective jurisdictions” limitation of the 1867 statute. Section 2255 placed habeas jurisdiction in the sentencing court, allowing federal prisoners as well as courts a more convenient forum for seeking post-conviction relief.
The Saving Clause in Federal Courts
The saving clause text precludes a federal prisoner from utilizing Section 2255 if the prisoner does not apply for relief in the sentencing court, or if that court has denied the prisoner relief. It preserves habeas review via a petition under Section 2241, however, if “it also appears that the remedy by [Section 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a federal prisoner’s] detention.” Since the creation of Section 2255, the Supreme Court has regarded Section 2255 and traditional habeas corpus as operating on distinct but parallel tracks, with the saving clause acting as a go-between.
The Court affirmed this relationship in two mid-20th century cases. In Sanders v. United States, the Court considered the creation of Section 2255 as a means to give a sentencing court “a remedy exactly commensurate” with that of habeas corpus in a court of confinement. In United States v. Hayman, decided four years after Section 2255’s enactment, the Court referenced the saving clause in observing that the habeas remedy remains open when Section 2255’s procedure is inadequate or ineffective, in some cases. Put differently, courts applying this analysis could withhold the traditional habeas remedy where the Section 2255 procedures are available. This position continued into the 21st century. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Court commented that the “writ of habeas corpus would be available” if Section 2255 proved inadequate or ineffective, thus underscoring the constitutionality of the more demanding Section 2255.
The Saving Clause and Recent Changes to Habeas Law
Congress intended Section 2255 motions to replace Section 2241 petitions for federal prisoners in most instances. The saving clause, codified at Section 2255(e), provides the exception. It sets forth that a motion to vacate is the exclusive means for a federal prisoner to raise a collateral challenge, unless “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
The most recent major change to the habeas corpus system came in 1996 with the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations for pursuing post-conviction relief, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). AEDPA further imposed limitations, in Section 2255(h), on filing second or successive motions to vacate. There are two exceptions that allow prisoners to file second or successive motions. The first, under Section 2255(h)(1), applies when there is newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense. The second, under Section 2255(h)(2), applies when the Supreme Court establishes a new interpretation of constitutional law that was previously unavailable and makes that interpretation retroactive to cases on collateral review.
