self-defense. Schnarr's brief failed to identify any excluded evidence that was relevant to this defense. At oral argument, his counsel could not identify any evidence that was excluded relating to the defense other than that he could not use the specific phrase "self-defense." Schnarr was able to explain his medical condition, that he was afraid, and that the situation prompted his decision to use deadly force. Schnarr presented his full defense on justification. But the facts simply did not support it.
In Schnarr I, this court considered whether there was a rational basis for affording Schnarr an imperfect self-defense instruction. Schnarr I, 2017 Ark. 10, at 18–19. In concluding that there was no rational basis for the instruction, we reasoned that there was "no evidence that Aldridge appeared to be armed or that he had made any threats to indicate that he was armed. Moreover, Schnarr denied that Aldridge had threatened him with bodily harm." Id. These facts have not changed. Here, Schnarr presented the exact same uncompelling facts as he did in Schnarr I, yet he demands an even greater level of justification. Consistent with our reasoning in Schnarr I, I find that Schnarr failed to present any evidence suggesting Mr. Aldridge was about to employ deadly force against him.
Therefore, regardless of the circuit court’s reason for denying the instruction, I would affirm for the same reasons expressed in Schnarr I—that the evidence does not support the jury instruction. The majority takes the exact same facts and holds that Schnarr is entitled to receive a higher level of justification instruction than it held he was not entitled to in Schnarr I. I find this inexplicable.
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