out in any way committing ourselves to an adhesion to this doctrine, which, though in many respects shown to be probable, has not yet been proved, we may say that it confirms, rather than overthrows, what theology has asserted respecting the wisdom of God. For while it is the wisdom of a man to adapt some means to some ends, and he has most wisdom who adapts most means to the accomplishment of most good ends, we should see, supposing the doctrine to be true, all means adapted to all ends. From the atom, and that which precedes the atom, to man, the highest organism with which we are acquainted, we might regard each step as an end which all previous conditions were intended to bring about; and each end so brought about we might regard as a condition necessary to that which was to follow. In entertaining this conception of nature, we rather enhance, than depreciate, our conceptions of the wisdom of God.
No doubt theologians are rather to blame in that they had exalted miracle as something more worthy of our awe and admiration than the ordinary works of God. But what miracle can be more wonderful than the existence of the world; or in what respects could our idea of the wisdom of God be more exalted than by considering the whole sum of visible things as resulting from conditions which He formed when He laid the foundations of the universe, as consequences dependent on antecedents which He determined and foreknew?
