Cite as 2012 Ark. 247
judgment in favor of the insurer on the duty to defend because the language of the exclusion was fairly susceptible of more than one meaning and there was a possibility that the injury or damage may fall within the policy coverage. Id.
In State Auto, supra, we were again presented with a dispute over the interpretation of a pollution-exclusion clause; however, the appeal involved the duty to indemnify, which is not as broad as the duty to defend. There, the insurer argued that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the insured because the court relied on Minerva and Anderson, which were wrongly decided, and because the circuit court failed to consider the parol evidence that the insurer offered to remove any alleged ambiguity. State Auto, 370 Ark. at 260, 258 S.W.3d at 743. We rejected the argument that we should overrule the cases as wrongly decided, but reversed and remanded on the second point. We concluded that the pollution exclusion was ambiguous because it used the same language that the Minerva court deemed ambiguous. Id. We then continued to the next step in the application of Minerva: an examination of any extrinsic or parol evidence submitted by the parties to resolve the ambiguity. Id. We noted that in Minerva we applied ejusdem generis, but observed that there the insurer did not apparently offer any extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity; whereas, in State Auto, the insurer did offer extrinsic evidence in favor of its interpretation. Id. We reversed the order awarding summary judgment because the circuit court had not considered the extrinsic evidence. Id.
In the present case, we have a pollution exclusion that is substantially similar to the exclusions we reviewed in Minerva and State Auto. Scottsdale contends that Morrow Valley
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