Cite as 2012 Ark. 247
Ins. Co., 276 Ark. 58, 60, 932 S.W.2d 420, 421 (1982)). Summary judgment is not proper when the parties submit disputed extrinsic evidence to support their proffered meaning of the disputed term. State Auto, 370 Ark. at 260, 258 S.W.3d at 743. When, however, parol evidence has not been admitted to resolve the ambiguity, the meaning of an ambiguity is a question of law, and it is error for a court to submit the issue to a jury. See Smith, 340 Ark. at 341, 10 S.W.3d at 850.
Here, an examination of the record on appeal does not reveal that the parties submitted extrinsic evidence in support of their interpretation of the word "pollutant" in the clause before us. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the pollution exclusion was ambiguous and that appellee was entitled to summary judgment on the duty to defend because there is a possibility that the injury or damage may fall within the policy coverage, and we affirm.
III. Cross-Appeal on Denial of Attorney's Fees
In the Fee Order, the circuit court denied appellee's motion for attorney's fees for services rendered by Stubbs, its in-house counsel. Appellee had requested reimbursement for Stubbs's representation in the amount of $72,033.24 in time and expenses.
However, this issue is not properly before us because there is not a final, appealable order with respect to the cross-appeal. The circuit court entered two orders on the same date, June 16, 2011: the Fee Order ruled on appellee's motion for supplemental relief, which included its request for attorney's fees, and Scottsdale's motion to stay pending Rule 54(b) certification and appeal; however, the Amended Order was the only order that included a
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