aeroplanes as instruments of distribution. The view seemed to prevail that propaganda was not worth casualties. Were this view well-founded it would be hard to understand why the Germans should have taken such drastic measures against British airmen accused of dropping propaganda leaflets. The Germans, who ought to be good judges, evidently feared our leaflets more than they feared our bombs. But the main issue was the determination of an Allied propaganda policy in regard to Germany—a matter of no little difficulty. As he had said in relation to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features of Allied propaganda—apart from questions of policy—would be the constant dissemination of knowledge of the immensity and of the growing efficiency of American effort. This feature he had endeavoured to develop, and he intended to develop it increasingly. On the subject of policy, however, he had submitted to the British Government an outline comprising the following points, which it was necessary to bring home to the Germans.
1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany accepted the Allied peace terms.
2. The existing alliance as a fighting