Page:Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Volume 1.djvu/427

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11. REINSCH: COLONIAL COMMON LAW 413 lerially modified, very often leading to the adoption of a system totally unlike the common law at that period. The historian will be interested in the reversion to the more ancient customs of the common law which we have ascertained in a number of cases. Such are the bestowal of judicial functions in law and in equity on the councils, pro- tests against the extraordinary jurisdiction of which recall the history of the jurisdiction of the Great Council and Chancellor in England in the 13th and 14th centuries. We have seen how archaic ideas of the jury were given a new lease of life; Georgia, even after the period of independ- ence, using a system of controlling the jury that was mod- elled on the old method of attaint. The idea of tort liability for crimes was revived, an idea that has been in the last decades again enforced with new emphasis by our legis- latures. But the most important and interesting revival of older institutions is found in the popular courts com- posed of a comparatively large number of judges, recalling the twelve thanes of early English law, who declared law and custom in a simple, straightforward manner. Men here appear to plead their own causes, unassisted save by the unremunerated help of a friend or by the court itself. The court is not a trained judge, drawing his knowledge from, and supporting his judgment upon the accumulated wisdom of ages of legal development, but a popular committee rep- resentative of the people and enforcing the general popular custom and sense of justice. We have also noted the prevailing views on the nature of law. The analytical theory of Hobbes, making positive law independent of moral considerations and basing it onV sovereign will, was not accepted at that time. The law of God, the law of nature, was looked upon as the true law, and all temporal legislation was considered to be binding only in so far as it was an expression of this natural law. With such a view of the nature of legal obligations, it does not seem strange that the magistrates should look for the true law in their own sense of right and justice, or, in the Puritan colonies, in the word of God. The views of the common law when expressed are of the