Page:Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Volume 1.djvu/747

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W. VEEDER: A CENTURY OF JUDICATURE 733 himself to the law with entire singleness of purpose and indefatigable industry. The vast arrears in chancery which accumulated during his administration is the most serious blot on his reputation. It would be an injustice to the memory of a really noble character to fix upon him the sole responsibility for that monstrous denial of justice. The chancery system had never been distinguished by despatch, and the rapid and sustained increase in litigation during Eldon's time accentuated the delay which has come to be associated with his name. The arrears in chancery were due, in part, to the state of the law, to the insufficiency of the time applied to judicial busi- ness, and to the want of an adequate number of courts. Lord Eldon was a powerful political officer as well as a judge, and during his time the quasi-political duties of his office were particularly onerous. The investigation of the Berkeley and Roxburghe peerage claims and the trial of Queen Caroline are illustrations of the extra-judicial de- mands made upon his time. Slight relief was eventually afforded by the appointment of a deputy speaker of the House; but the ultimate establishment of a vice-chancellor's court was not an immediate §uccess, and it was many years before the master of the rolls was enabled to render any effective assistance. Considering the vast political power that Lord Eldon exercised in the cabinet councils, it is, however, a deep and permanent reproach upon his reputation that he did practically nothing to remedy the chancery system. And it must be admitted that Lord Eldon's judicial methods were dilatory in the extreme. No one was ever better qual- ified by nature and by training to arrive at a speedy deci- sion. Indeed, during his short term in the Court of Common Pleas he showed a capacity for prompt decision which con- trasts curiously with his marked indecision in chancery. His delay was really due, not so much to want of readiness in reaching a decision, as to dilatoriness in formulating his opinion. The fact that this delay was due in large measure to his extreme conscientiousness does not affect the result, although it does to some extent relieve his memory.