Page:Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Volume 1.djvu/782

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768 V. BENCH AND BAR demnation of the judge. . . . You have been asked, gentle- men, to give the defendant the benefit of any doubts you may entertain. Most assuredly it is your duty to do so. It is the business of the prosecution to bring home guilt to the accused to the satisfaction of the jury. But the doubt of which the accused is entitled to the benefit must be the doubt that a rational, that a sensible man may fairly entertain, not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has not the moral courage to decide, but shelters itself in a vain and idle scepticism. ... I should be the last man to suggest to any individual member of the jury that if he entertains conscientious, fixed convictions, although he may stand alone against his eleven fellow jurors, he should give up the profound and unalterable convictions of his own mind. . . . But then we must recollect that he has a duty to perform, and that it is this. He is bound to give the case every possible consideration before he finally determines upon the course he will pursue, and if a man finds himself differing from the rest of his fellows with whom he is associated in the great and solemn function of the adminis- tration of justice, he should start with the fair presumption that the one individual is more likely to be wrong than the eleven from whom he differs. He should bear in mind that the great purpose of trial by jury is to obtain unanimity and put an end to further litigation ; he should address himself, and in all diflSdence in his own judgment, to the task he has to perform, and carefully consider all the reasons and argu- ments which the rest of the body are able to put forward for the judgment they are ready to pronounce, and he should let no self-conceit, no notion of being superior to the rest in intelligence, no vain presumption of superiority on his part, stand in the way. . . . That is the duty which the juryman owes to the administration of justice and the opin- ion of his fellows, and therefore I must protest against the attempt to encourage a single juryman, or one or two among a body of twelve, to stand out resolutely, positively, and with fixed determination and purpose, against the judgment and opinion of the majority. . . . There is but one course to follow in the discharge of great public duties. No man should be insensible to public opinion who has to discharge