9. Sources differ in their estimates of the number of countries where the network has been present.[1] The network’s interest in exaggerating its global presence adds to the challenges of counting and classification.[2]Due to these challenges, we used confidence assessments when commenting on countries of operation in this chapter and present these in Table 1
Table 1: Explanation of confidence assessments for countries of operation
| High Confidence | Medium Confidence | Low Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| There are Prigozhin-affiliated structures in the country with verified images of Wagner mercenaries, official declaration/ recognition of Wagner operatives’ presence by host governments, and/or other official documents that point to a close-to-certain conclusion. We also treat information as reliable if it comes from highly trusted sources (for example, US Treasury designations) | There are multiple reports of Wagner presence, but data is of a lower quality or only partially verifiable, making conclusions likely but not certain. | Data is either entirely unverifiable or of much lower quality, making conclusions possible, but neither certain nor likely. |
10. The evidence we received has given us high confidence that the Wagner Network has conducted military operations in at least seven countries since 2014: Ukraine; Syria; the Central African Republic (CAR); Sudan; Libya; Mozambique; and Mali. A primary purpose for authorities inviting Wagner onto their territories has been to help failing or fragile regimes retain power (paragraphs 16–17). Wagner’s interventions in African countries are “governed by agreements negotiated by Prigozhin’s staff”, which provide concessions for mineral deposits, in exchange for Wagner “military operations supporting the Kremlin’s regime of choice”, the protection of local infrastructure and military training.[3] Further information about Wagner’s military involvement in these seven countries is summarised in Table 2, drawing on the open-source research we commissioned and other sources.
- ↑ This is likely due to varying methodologies when it comes to what qualifies as a Wagner operation, as well as the limited transparency surrounding the network. Examples of varying estimates:
In 2022, the Government listed the Wagner’s countries of operation as Ukraine, Sudan, Mozambique, Syria, CAR, Libya and Mali. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 1
The Dossier Center noted that Prigozhin’s staff were interested in Syria and over 50 African countries, which are “ranked into three categories – the first being the countries most vulnerable and beneficial to the Kremlin […] and the third being the least interesting with high levels of cooperation with other foreign powers (according to 2018 internal documents). Since then, more than ten countries listed have hosted Russian mercenaries and political technologists (CAR, Sudan, Mali, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, South Africa, Mozambique, DRC, Angola, Guinea).” Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 31 - ↑ As an example of possible inflation, in September 2022, Prigozhin praised Wagner “heroes” and alluded to their role in Latin America. However, the open-source research we commissioned for this inquiry could not verify with high or medium confidence that the Wagner Network had conducted operations in Latin America since 2014. The UK Government has not recognised the group’s presence in Latin America. Although it is not possible to verify at this stage, that does not mean that the Group has no operations in the continent. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025)
- ↑ Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 29. See also Anonymous (WGN0026)
